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11 Introduction
Consider a market where a particular good is produced by K ﬁrms. The demands
are given by functions Gi(pi,p−i),a n dﬁrms compete in prices. How can we ﬁnd the
ﬁrms’ optimal prices in a static setting? Surprisingly, the answer to this very basic
question of oligopoly theory is yet incomplete.
Faced with such a question, one can ﬁrst search for a pure strategy equilibrium. It
is relatively straightforward to write out the proﬁt functions, diﬀerentiate them, and
try to solve the resulting system of equations. There exists a large body of literature
examining restrictions on demand or best reply functions that ensure the existence
and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium (see Vives (1999) for an overview
of the latest results in this area). However, as is well-known, not all demand functions
result in a pure strategy price equilibrium. In such cases, one must proceed to search
for mixed strategy equilibria.
The use of mixed strategy equilibria in oligopoly pricing models has also been
extensive. Some examples that result in price dispersion include literature on sales
(Shilony (1977), Varian (1980), Gal-Or (1982), Narasimhan (1988) and Baye et al.
(1992)), capacity constraints (Beckmann (1965), Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), Davidson and Deneckere (1986),
and Allen and Hellwig (1993)), and consumer search (Burdett and Judd (1983), Rob
(1985), Stahl (1988), Dana (1994), and McAfee (1995)). An important feature of these
models is that they all use discontinuous demands and predict that the ﬁrms pick their
2prices from an interval according to some continuous probability distribution function.
This is not a coincidence, as Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) have shown that in the
symmetric case, for the type of discontinuities encountered in the above models, the
equilibrium mixed strategies are atomless on the set of discontinuities. The technique
for computing these equilibria is by now standard.
B u tw h a th a p p e n sw h e nGi do not have singularities and do not result in a pure
strategy equilibrium? As an example, take any of the price dispersion models and
"smooth" the demand discontinuity by adding some heterogeneity into consumer
preferences.1 As shown by Benessy (1989) for the model of price competition with
capacity constraints, if this heterogeneity is small enough, a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist. The technique for computing an atomless mixed strategy equilibrium
does not work for such demands. Thus, we know that the mixed strategy equilibrium
exists2, but do not know anything else about it.
The purpose of this work is to ﬁll in this gap in the oligopoly pricing theory.
I prove that for analytic demand functions a mixed strategy price equilibrium is
characterized by each ﬁrm charging a ﬁnite number of prices. This characterization
covers the functions typically used to model the demand for diﬀerentiated products,
1For example, instead of consumers purchasing the product with the lowest price, assume that
their tastes are heterogeneous, and the price premium they are willing to pay for the ﬁrm’s product
is distributed according to some CDF. In consumer search models assume that all consumers have
diﬀering search costs, thus there will be no mass of consumers with zero search costs.
2This existence result is provided by Glicksberg (1952).
3for example, logit, probit, or CES. The ﬁniteness result gives a theoretical foundation
for the computational technique used to ﬁnd the mixed strategy equilibria when
demands are analytic.
To illustrate an application of the theory developed in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r ,
I compute the optimal pricing strategies for a simple example of a duopoly with some
loyal consumers and some switchers, whose preferences for the goods are distributed
normally.
2M a i n R e s u l t
Consider a market where a particular good is produced by K ﬁrms at a zero marginal
cost. Firms compete in prices p that range between 0 and r,w h e r er is the maximum
price any consumer is willing to pay for the product. The set of consumers has
measure 1. Consumers have heterogeneous tastes for the goods produced by the ﬁrms.
These tastes result in the demand functions Gi(p) that show the percent of consumers
captured by ﬁrm i as a function of prices of all ﬁrms p, where p =( p1,p 2,...,pK).T h e
demand functions Gi(p) are analytic, which means that each function has a Taylor
series about each point x that converges to this function in an open neighborhood of
x.
Since all analytic functions are continuous, the demand functions Gi are continu-
ous, and the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fe a c hﬁrm is also continuous. Glicksberg (1952) proved
that for the case with continuous payoﬀs and a non-empty and compact set of actions
4there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 For the setting described above there exists a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Now, in Theorem 1, I will show that the support of the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium consists of a ﬁnite number of prices.
Theorem 1 Let the demand function Gi(p) be an analytic function on [0,r]K.I n
addition, Gi(p) > 0 for any p =( p1,...,p i−1,0,p i+1,...,p K). Then the support of the
price distribution of ﬁrm i in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium has a ﬁnite number
of points.
Proof. Without loss of generality I will prove the theorem for i =1 . Assume
that ﬁrms 2,...,K are charging the prices from the set Λ =[ 0 ,r]K−1 according to
some probability distribution function F(p−1),w h e r ep−1 =( p2,...,pK). Then, the








Assume that the support of the price distribution of ﬁrm 1 contains an inﬁnite
number of points. p1G1(p) i sa na n a l y t i cf u n c t i o ns i n c ei ti sap r o d u c to fa n a l y t i c
functions. Then, by Theorem 7.1.1 from Karlin (1959), π1(p1)=c for all p1 ∈ [0,r].3
3This theorem is stated as follows. If the kernel is analytic and if one of the players has an
optimal strategy whose support contains an inﬁnite number of points, then every strategy that is
optimal for the other player is an equalizing strategy (Karlin (1959)).
5However, π1(0) = 0, therefore the proﬁt function must be equal to zero at every point
of the price support.
G1(p) > 0 for any p =( 0 ,p 2,...,p K). Since G1 is a continuous function, then
G1(p) > 0 for any p =( ε,p2,...,pK) provided that ε is small enough. It means that
ﬁrm 1 charging price ε will have a positive demand regardless of the competitors’
prices. Thus π1(ε) > 0 — contradiction.
Remark 1 Theorem 1 easily extends to the case of general cost functions. First, as-
sume that the cost function C1(·) is everywhere analytic. Then ψ(p)=p1G1(p1,p−1)−
C1(G1(p1,p−1)) is analytic since the sums, products, and compositions of analytic




c for all p1 ∈ [0,r] if the support of the price distribution of the ﬁrst ﬁrm contains
an inﬁnite number of points. Now, in addition to the previous assumption that the
ﬁrm sells a positive amount at price zero, also assume that C1(·) is nondecreasing
and that G1(p1,p−1) is nonincreasing in p1.S i n c eπ1 is a constant, π1 must be equal
to π1(0) everywhere on [0;r]. Now, consider charging a price ε.S i n c eG1(p1,p−1) is
nonincreasing in p1,b yc h a r g i n gε the ﬁrm will produce at most the amount that it
produces at price 0.S i n c e C1(·) is nondecreasing, the ﬁrm’s costs when charging ε
will be at most the costs that it has when charging 0. If ε is small enough, the ﬁrm is
assured of a positive demand, thus, its revenues are positive. Therefore, by charging
ε i n s t e a do fz e r ot h eﬁrm increases its revenues and does not increase the costs, so
π1(ε) >π 1(0) — contradiction.
6Remark 2 The relation between the analyticity of the payoﬀ functions and the ﬁnite-
ness of the support of a mixed strategy equilibrium was also addressed by Karlin
(1959). In Theorem 7.1.2 he proved this result for the analytic payoﬀ functions that
are strictly decreasing at some point ξ0 for any strategy of the rival. This require-
ment is rather restrictive for the pricing games, as it implies that the proﬁt function
p1G1(p1,p−1)−C1(G1(p1,p−1)) is strictly decreasing at some p1 for all possible p−1.
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 together imply that for the demand functions typ-
ically encountered in practice (such as logit, probit, or CES) a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium exists and, moreover, the solution must involve a ﬁnite number of prices.
Knowing that each ﬁrm charges a ﬁnite number of prices, it is possible to write
out a standard set of equations, the solution to which gives the mixed strategy equi-
librium.4 It is beyond the scope of this work to perform a technical analysis of how
to compute these mixed strategy equilibria or to examine their properties. Instead,
to illustrate the application of Theorem 1, in the next section I will provide a simple
example of a duopoly model and calculate mixed strategy equilibria for a few values
of the parameters of the demand function.
4These equations include the ﬁrst order conditions — the proﬁt function must be maximized at
each point of the support of the price distribution. Also, the proﬁts at all the points of the support
of the price distribution have to be equal to each other.
73 Application
Consider a market where a particular good is produced by two ﬁrms. Assume that
prices range between 0 and 1 (1 is the maximum price any consumer is willing to pay
for the product). Marginal cost is equal to zero. Each consumer buys one unit per
period. There are two types of consumers: loyals and switchers. Each ﬁrm has share
α (between 0 and 1
2) of loyal consumers — those who buy only from their favorite ﬁrm,
provided that the price is lower than 1. The remaining (1 − 2α) are switchers with
heterogeneous tastes for the products that are distributed normally with mean 0 and
variance σ2 (σ shows the degree of consumer heterogeneity). Thus, the demand is












. The shape of this function is
shown in Figure 1.
This demand function satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1,
thus there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium that must have a ﬁnite number
of prices. Figure 2 presents the equilibrium pricing strategies for the diﬀerent values
of the parameters of the demand function.
I ﬁx α to be 0.25 and let σ change from 0.3 (where a pure strategy equilibrium
exists) to 0.068 (where in the mixed strategy equilibrium each ﬁrm mixes between
ﬁve prices). For each value of σ in that range I plot the optimal pricing strategies
of the ﬁrms. For example, for σ =0 .1,e a c hﬁrm uses four prices, and the mixed
strategy equilibrium involves the ﬁrms charging prices {p1 =0 .4673; p2 =0 .7307;
p3 =1 ;p4 =0 .9384} with corresponding probabilities {γ1 =0 .6284; γ2 =0 .2296;






Demand of Firm 1
γ3 =0 .0636; γ4 =0 .0784}.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This work extends the theory of static price competition to the case of analytic
demands and costs functions, for which no pure strategy price equilibrium exists.
I show that the mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by each ﬁrm charging
a ﬁnite number of prices. This is in contrast with the existing literature on mixed
equilibria in prices, which uses discontinuous demands and, thus, has ﬁrms mixing
over a continuum of prices. This characterization provides researchers with a tool to
calculate mixed strategy equilibria in situations for which previously it was unclear
9Figure 2: Optimal pricing strategies for α =0 .25




































how to ﬁnd a solution.
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